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Abstract
There is a vast literature on intergenerational mobility in sociology and economics. Similar
interest has emerged for the phenomenon of over-education in both disciplines. There are no
studies, however, linking these two research lines. We study the relationship between social
mobility and over-education in a context of educational expansion. Our framework allows for
the evaluation of several policies, including those a¤ecting social segregation, early intervention
programs and the power of unions. Results show the evolution of social mobility, over-education,
income inequality and equality of opportunity under each scenario.
Keywords: good jobs, intergenerational cultural transmission, aggregate productivity, match-
ing model, over-education
J.E.L. Classication Code:. J21, J24, J62, I24
Resum:
Hi ha una àmplia literatura sobre la mobilitat intergeneracional a les àrees de sociologia i
economia. El fenomen de la sobreeducació ha suscitat interès similar en ambdues disciplines. No
hi ha estudis, però, que uneixin aquestes dues línies dinvestigació. En aquest article sestudia
la relació entre la mobilitat social i la sobre-educació en un context dexpansió de leducació. El
nostre marc permet lavaluació de diverses polítiques, com les que afecten la segregació social, els
programes dintervenció primerenca i el poder dels sindicats. Els resultats mostren levolució de
la mobilitat social, la sobre-educació, la desigualtat i la igualtat doportunitats en cada escenari.
Paraules clau: transmissió cultural, mobilitat intergeneracional, funció de matching, sobre-
educació.
Classicació JEL: J21, J24, J62, I24
1 Introduction
There is a vast literature on inter-generational mobility (see reviews of the empirical literature
in Solon, 1999; Björklund and Jäntti, 2009 and Black and Devereux, 2011). Social mobility
is often studied in relationship to the process of development, wealth distribution, inequality
and economic growth. These variables are usually linked via individualsinvestment decisions
in education and its return. Education is positively related to development and growth and
explains at least partially wealth distribution and inequality. The cost of education is commonly
dened in monetary terms and the introduction of some type of capital market imperfections
explain why kids from poor families have less access to education than kids from richer families
(Becker and Tomes, 1986; Galor and Tsiddon, 1997; Loury, 1981; Maoz and Moav, 1999).1
Lefgren, Lindquist and Sims (2012), however, estimate that no more than 37 percent of the
income persistence between fathers and sons is attributable to the causal e¤ect of nancial
resources. Therefore, there is room for other mechanisms to explain the persistence in income
across generations.
The so called mechanistic persistencerefers to the transmission of human capital indepen-
dently of the level of nancial investment. It includes the transmission of genetic traits and
other non-nancial investments. Understanding the transmission mechanisms in place is crucial
to develop e¤ective policies to improve equality of opportunities and social mobility. Income
redistribution might be useful if nancial constraints are binding (Benabou, 2002), but they
might be futile otherwise. Mayer (2008), for instance, assumes the presence of heterogeneous
abilities, which are transmitted across generations, generating a positive correlation between
fathersand sonsincomes via self-selection into education. Early childhood intervention pro-
grams to improve ability of children from low-income families would then lead to better results
than subsidizing college education.
Our paper proposes a cultural transmission mechanism similar to the one proposed in Bisin
and Verdier (2001). Both direct parental e¤ort in terms of time devoted to children and social-
ization with neighbors a¤ect the probability of the kid to obtain high education. Several papers
provide empirical evidence on the importance of early parental attention (Heckman, Pinto and
Savelyev, 2012; Restuccia and Urrutia, 2004;) and neighborhood e¤ects (Case and Katz, 1991;
ORegan and Quigley, 1996; Cutler and Glaeser, 1997) on kidsfuture educational outcomes.
We combine the cultural transmission of education with the presence of frictions in the
labor market. This allows us to introduce another phenomenon in the analysis of social mo-
bility: over-education. Over-education occurs when individuals job require a lower level of
1An exception is Galor and Tsiddon (1997), who study the e¤ect of technological progress on intergenerational
mobility under the assumption of perfect capital markets. Technological progress increases incentives to invest
in education overtime, leading to higher mobility. We di¤er from them in that we do not include technological
progress, but cultural transmission of education and frictions in the labor market.
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education than the one acquired. It is a consequence of the fast educational expansion that
occurred in most developed countries during last decades and it has been studied since the
late 70s(Brunello, Garibaldi, and Wasmer, 2007; Freeman, 1976; Sicherman and Galor, 1990;
Kalleberg and Sorensen, 1979). There are no studies, however, linking over-education and inter-
generational mobility. We study the relationship between social mobility and over-education in
a context of educational expansion. Our framework allows for the evaluation of several policies,
including those a¤ecting social segregation, early intervention programs and the power of unions.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we develop the theoretical model,
which comprises of three main parts: the education transmission mechanism, the job allocation
process and the individuals problem. In section 3 we rst dene the variables of interest to
then perform several policy evaluations using simulation techniques. Finally, section 4 concludes
giving directions for further research.
2 The Model
We set up two initially independent mechanisms in our model. One refers to the educational
attainment of the population and the other explains how individuals get allocated to jobs. Then
we study how the interaction of these two mechanisms determines several measures of interest of
a country. These measures include the level of social mobility, over-education, income inequality
and aggregate productivity level.
The rst mechanism consists on the transmission of education from parents to children. This
is thought to occur as the inter-generational cultural transmission in Bisin and Verdier (2001)
adapted to the transmission of education. We follow Patacchini and Zenou (2011). All parents
prefer high education for their kids. With some probability they succeed in transmitting their
preferences, otherwise children get the education level of a random individual of the population.
We depart from any capital market imperfections story or wealth transmission since these e¤ects
have been already widely analyzed in the literature (Becker and Tomes, 1986; Galor and Tsiddon,
1997; Loury, 1981; Maoz and Moav, 1999).
The second mechanism in our model explains how individuals get allocated to jobs using a
simple matching model. The number of good jobs is endogenously determined as well as the
productivity level. Moreover, individuals with parents in a good job are more likely to nd a good
job than those individuals whose parents have a bad job. This is related to the fast expanding
literature on networks, that emphasizes the importance of having the right connections to obtain
the right information (Corak and Piraino, 2011; Ioannides and Loury, 2004).
We study the steady state equilibrium as well as transition dynamics, which are very relevant
since transition might take several generations.
2
2.1 Education Transmission
Let us start describing one generation of individuals. Each generation will be denoted by the time
when they are born. Each generation consists of a continuum of individuals of nite measure
. Individuals are distinguishable according to their education level and their network type.
We assume two education levels and two types of networks. Let the education level be Low or
High (i 2 fL;Hg) and the network type Bad or Good (j 2 fB;Gg). When the individual is
still not working his/her network type is determined by the job type of his/her parent. Once
the individual starts working his/her network type is determined by his/her job type. Let i;jt
be the population measure of educational type i working in type j job for generation t. In other
words, i;jt represents the population measure of educational type i and network type j of the
generation t. All individuals with low education are employed in bad jobs and therefore have
bad networks (LGt = 0), while individuals with high education may be employed in good or
bad jobs. Hence  = HGt + 
HB
t + 
LB
t .
Each individual has one o¤-spring. Parents transmit their preferences for education to their
children in the following fashion. In general all parents prefer the high education level for their
kids. They exert however di¤erent e¤ort in transmitting this preference. Parents do not always
succeed in transmitting their preference. We apply a similar model to the one developed in Bisin
and Verdier (2001). Parents make a direct e¤ort to transmit their educational preference. If they
fail, then the kid gets the education type of a random individual within the population (oblique
socialization). The main di¤erence is that all parents in our model have the same preferences for
their kids, independently of their type, while in Bisin and Verdier individuals want to transmit
their type. We introduce an index of segregation of the country (IS) that will indicate whether
the oblique socialization occurs only within networks or it can also occur across networks.
Let dijt

jt

represent the direct e¤ort exerted by parents of generation t with education
type i and network j to transmit their educational preference to their children, where
jt = global;t(1  IS) + jlocal;tIS ; (1)
global;t =
HBt + 
HG
t

; (2)
Blocal;t =
HBt
HBt + 
LB
t
; (3)
Glocal;t = 1: (4)
The direct e¤ort depends on the proportion of people with high education in the network and the
level of segregation of the society. In the case of perfect segregation across networks, IS = 1 and
then only the proportion of high educated individuals in the network matters for socialization.
In contrast, for a non-segregated society, the index of segregation of the country IS is zero and
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jt corresponds to the proportion of highly educated individuals in the whole population. We
also allow for intermediate levels of segregation, IS 2 [0; 1].
Whether dijt(
j
t ) is increasing or decreasing in 
j
t will tell us whether direct and oblique
socialization are complementaries or substitutes. Pattachini and Zenou (2011) estimate this
relationship for the UK and nd that neighborhood and parental involvement in kids education
are complementary.
The direct e¤ort exerted by parents translates into a probability of success in direct socializa-
tion, dened by the function f . Let this probability of success depend on the direct e¤ort exerted
by parents, d; and the proportion of high educated individuals, jt , that is, f
i(dijt(
j
t ); 
j
t ).
We assume that f i(0; ) = 0, that is, without e¤ort there is no direct socialization. The
function f is increasing in e¤ort d and . This means that higher e¤ort by parents increases the
probability of success in transmitting their preferences and given a level of e¤ort, having better
neighborhood translates into higher probability of success in direct socialization. We assume
therefore some kind of spillovers in the direct socialization process. Spillovers are needed in
order to allow for complementarity between direct and oblique socialization.
Based on the empirical evidence in Guryan, Hurst and Kearney (2008) and Patacchini and
Zenou (2011) we assume that parents with low education have lower quality direct e¤ort than
high education individuals.
fL(dLjt(
j
t ); 
j
t ) = f
H(dHjt(
j
t ); 
j
t ) (5)
where  < 1:
We assume that the probability of oblique socialization is an increasing and convex function
on the proportion of highly educated individuals in the society.2 Lets denote g(jt ) the proba-
bility of oblique socialization. g(:) is such that g0 > 0 and g00 > 0. This implies that there is a
reinforcing e¤ect of having more educated individuals in the society. Increasing the proportion
of human capital has a stronger e¤ect on the probability of socialization when there are already
many highly educated individuals. Moreover, if everybody has high education, then oblique
socialization is successful with certainty, g(1) = 1.
Then the probabilities of education transition are the following:
iHjt+1 = f
i(dijt(
j
t ); 
j
t ) + (1  f i(dijt(jt ); jt ))g(jt ); (6)
iLjt+1 = (1  f i(dijt(jt ); jt ))(1  g(jt )): (7)
iHjt+1 is the probability of a parent with education i and network j to transmit his/her
preference for high education to his/her kid. It has two components, the probability of success in
2This assumption is needed in order to obtain an interior equilibrium (or equivalently, a non-degenerate
population distribution).
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direct transmission plus the probability of success in oblique socialization if direct transmission
fails. iLjt+1 represents the probability of a parent with education i and network j to fail to
transmit the high education to the kid. This happens in the event of failure in direct and
oblique transmission.
Given these transition probabilities, we can nd the measure of young individuals for each
type of education and network. Let ijt+1 be the measure of young individuals with education
type i and network type j just before entering the labor market. Recall that the network type
of this individuals is determined by the job type of their parents.
Lt+1 = 
LL
t+1
LB
t +
HL
B;t+1
HB
t +
HL
G;t+1
HG
t ; (8)
HBt+1 = 
LH
t+1
LB
t +
HH
B;t+1
HB
t ; (9)
HGt+1 = 
HH
G;t+1
HG
t : (10)
or in matrix notation:264 
L
t+1
HBt+1
HGt+1
375 =
264 
LL
t+1 
HL
B;t+1 
HL
G;t+1
LHt+1 
HH
B;t+1 0
0 0 HHG;t+1
375
264 
LB
t
HBt
HGt
375 :
Once the education transmission is completed we observe three types of children. Next we
study how this young individuals, given their education and network type, are allocated to jobs.
2.2 Job allocation
Let us now describe the labor demand. As already mentioned above, there are two types of job:
good and bad. A job exists when a suitable worker lls a vacancy created by a rm. Each rm
can open only one vacancy. The vacancy cost is  > 0 for a good job and 0 for a bad job. Firms
are expected prot maximizers and there is free entry. Whereas there are search frictions in
the market for good jobs, the market for bad jobs is assumed perfectly competitive. Therefore,
everybody can instantly nd a bad job and there are as many bad jobs as required. On the
other hand, the matching of highly educated individuals to good vacancies is not without e¤ort.
Individuals must search in order to nd a good vacancy. The total number of good jobs created
is determined by a matching function m(ut; vt), where vt denotes the number of good vacancies
opened and ut denotes the total e¢ ciency units of search devoted to the good job market (as in
Bentolila, Michelacci and Suarez, 2008).
Similar to Bentolila et al (2008) we normalize to one the maximum e¢ ciency units of search
for a good job that an individual can use including formal channels (employment agencies,
newspaper adds, internet search, etc.) and networks. Each individual has access to a fraction of
this maximum e¢ ciency units of search. We assume that young individuals whose parents are in
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good jobs have better networks than young individuals with parents in bad jobs. Therefore, the
former are endowed with a larger fraction of e¢ ciency units of search than the latter. In other
words, the network type is associated with di¤erent endowments of e¢ ciency units of search, S
for type G, s for type B with 1  S > s > 0. Therefore, the total e¢ ciency units of search in
the good jobs market is ut = SHGt + s
HB
t .
Assume that the matching function for the good job,m(u; v); is increasing in both arguments,
continuous function and upper bounded by Minfut; vtg.3
Denote the production obtained in a bad job by yB;t and the production in a good job by
yG;t. The production of the bad job is given entirely to the worker as wage. In contrast, in
the good job, workers and rms negotiate under a Nash bargaining game. The solution is that
each player gets a proportion of the total surplus created by a good match, which is yG;t  yB;t,
plus the outside option. Let workers power be represented by . Then the wage of a worker
employed in a good job is wGt =  (yG;t   yB;t) + yB;t. The following condition ensures that all
individuals with high education prefer a good job rather than a bad job:
spwGt > yB;t; (11)
where p = m(ut;vt)ut 2 [0; 1] is the probability per e¢ ciency unit of search to nd a good job.
Notice that the number of realized matches corresponds to the number of individual with high
education in a good job, HGt = m(ut; vt).
The production function in each sector is assumed to have the following specication:
yG;t = At
"
global;t = At

HBt + 
HG
t

"
;
yB;t = At
 
Blocal;t
"
= At

HBt
  HGt
"
; (12)
where " < 1 and At represents the productivity level. Notice that with this specication of the
production function we are assuming that production of a good job depends on the proportion of
highly educated individual in the whole population, meanwhile production of a bad job depends
on the proportion of highly educated people in the bad job holders. It follows that yG;t > yB;t.
We assume free entry of rms, and hence, rms will open new vacancies in the good jobs
market until the expected prot of opening a vacancy equals its cost:4
q(1  ) (yG;t   yB;t) = : (13)
where q = m(ut;vt)vt 2 [0; 1] is the probability for a rm of getting a vacancy lled.
3Ribo and Vilalta-Bu (2012) analyze which properties are necessary for particular matching functions to be
bounded from above by the number of search units and vacancies.
4To be precise, by the expected prot of opening a vacancy we mean the proportion of the expected surplus
generated by the creation of a new job that goes to the rm.
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Firms decide to open vacancies after all educational decisions have been taken, so they know
how many students of each type there are (L; HG; HB), which determines the supply side
of the labor market (the amount of e¢ ciency units of search). They also know which will be
the production level of the good job, since it is a function of the percentage of highly educated
individuals in the whole economy (
HG+HB
 ). They cannot know, however, how many students
will end up over-educated. We assume that they expect the production in the bad sector to
be equal to that of the previous period (E(yB;t) = yB;t 1). Therefore, the following free entry
condition determines the number of vacancies of good jobs.
m(ut; vt)
vt
=

(1  ) (yG;t   yB;t 1) : (14)
Given this amount of vacancies, the probabilities of obtaining a job type z conditional on
having high education and being in the network type j (P jzt ) for individuals of generation t are
the following:
PBBt = 1  sp; (15)
PGBt = 1  Sp; (16)
PBGt = sp; (17)
PGGt = Sp: (18)
Recall that in our model, bad jobs are not rationed. We therefore have no unemployment in our
model.
The dynamics of population measures of each type are dened by:
LBt+1 = 
LL
t+1
LB
t +
HL
B;t+1
HB
t +
HL
G;t+1
HG
t (19)
HBt+1 = 
LH
t+1P
BB
t+1
LB
t +
HH
B;t+1P
BB
t+1
HB
t +
HH
G;t+1P
GB
t+1
HG
t (20)
HGt+1 = 
LH
t+1P
BG
t+1
LB
t +
HH
B;t+1P
BG
t+1
HB
t +
HH
G;t+1P
GG
t+1
HG
t (21)
or in matrix form:264 
LB
t+1
HBt+1
HGt+1
375 =
264 
LL HLB 
HL
G
LHPBB HHB P
BB HHG P
GB
LHPBG HHB P
BG HHG P
GG
375
264 
LB
t
HBt
HGt
375 :
2.3 The individuals problem
Individuals, when choosing their e¤ort in transmitting their education preferences, maximize a
composed utility function which is made up of two parts: their own utility and the expected util-
ity that their kids will get. They derive utility from consumption and leisure.5 Each individual
5 Individuals consume all their earnings in our model because we want to abstract from any monetary transfer
to the kids, which has been already widely studied in the literature.
7
is endowed with 1 unit of leisure and has to decide how much of it will be devoted to him/herself
and how much will be devoted to the kid. The time devoted to the kid corresponds to the direct
e¤ort of socialization. There is empirical evidence that supports the idea that parental care of
the kid is a determinant of the future education level and other socioeconomic variables of the
kid (Heckman, Pinto and Savelyev, 2012; Restuccia and Urrutia, 2004).
When parents decide how much time to invest in educating their kids, they do not know the
salaries their kids will get. We assume their best guess is to consider they will face the same
situation as in their generation. Moreover, we assume that they do not take into account the
e¤ect of their decision in the aggregate outcome of the economy.
Then, the problem that parents of education i; having a job j have to solve is
Max
flijt ;dijt g
wt + u(l
ij
t ; d
ij
t ) + 
iH
jt+1Et(V
iH
jt+1) + 
iL
jt+1Et(V
iL
jt+1)
subject to wt = yB;t + ki=G (yG;t   yB;t) ;
lijt = 1  dijt ;
where dijt and l
ij
t is how much of leisure is devoted to children and to oneself respectively and
Et(V
iL
j;t+1) = Et(w
LB
t+1) = yB;t;
Et(V
iH
j;t+1) = Et(w
Hj
t+1) = yB;t + P
jG
t  (yG;t   yB;t) ;
iHjt+1 = f
i(dijt ; 
j
t ) + (1  f i(dijt ; jt ))g(jt );
iLjt+1 = (1  f i(dijt ; jt ))(1  g(jt )):
Here, we are assuming that parents do not take into account the future cost of socializing
children that their kids will have to bear. Parents control variable is the time investment in
education, dt.
The rst order condition to the general problem is the following:
 u1 + u2 + @f
i
@d
(1  g(jt ))Et(V iHt+1   V iLt+1) = 0: (22)
Notice here that since u1 > 0 and
@f i
@d > 0; we have that u1 > u2 in an interior equilibrium.
The economic interpretation of the rst order condition is that the marginal cost of spending
time with the kid (which is the lost utility of leisure) must be equal to the benet of spending
time with the kid (the utility/disutility you get from spending time with the kid plus the increase
in expected utility of your kid).
The second order condition to the general problem is:
u11   2u12 + u22 + @
2f i
@d2
(1  g(jt ))Et(V iHt+1   V iLt+1) < 0: (23)
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We assume a negative SOC in order to ensure that there is a maximum and the problem is
well dened. We assume satiation in leisure (u11 < 0).
Using the implicit function theorem we can check whether there is complementarity or sub-
stitutability between direct e¤ort and quality of the society.
@dt
@jt
=
 
h
@2f i
@d@jt
(1  g(jt ))  @f
i
@d g
0(jt )
i
Et(V
iH
t+1   V iLt+1)
u11   2u12 + u22 + @2f i@d2 (1  g(jt ))Et(V iHt+1   V iLt+1)
: (24)
Proposition 1. If @
2f i
@d@jt
(1   g(jt )) > @f
i
@d g
0(jt ), then there is complementarity between
direct e¤ort and oblique socialization. That is, @dt
@jt
> 0. If @
2f i
@d@jt
(1   g(jt )) < @f
i
@d g
0(jt ), then
there is substitutability between direct e¤ort and oblique socialization. That is, @dt
@jt
< 0.
Notice that for the case f i

dijt ; 
j
t

= dijt , we have only substitutability between direct e¤ort
and jt .
Notice that these conditions involve d and . Therefore, depending on the values d and
 (endogenous to the model) we will observe substitutability or complementarity between di-
rect and oblique socialization. Moreover, an economy may change from one state to the other
overtime.
To allow for the possibility of complementarity, we need that the marginal e¤ect of e¤ort on
f is higher on societies with higher . That is, given two societies with di¤erent proportion of
highly educated people whose citizens exert exactly the same level of e¤ort in educating kids, the
society with higher proportion of educated parents will have a higher marginal e¤ect of e¤ort.
In words of Bisin and Verdier (p.308): "direct socialization is in this case more e¢ cient, other
things equal, when the trait to be transmitted is held by a majority of the population, and hence
when oblique transmission is more e¢ cient". For getting complementarity of direct and oblique
socialization we need a minimum level of these spillovers.
2.4 Timing
Let us summarize the model by stating clearly the timing within each period. The economy
starts with an initial distribution of the population: LBt ; 
HB
t ; 
HG
t . This initial condition
determines the production level of good and bad jobs in this period. Each individual decides
how much direct e¤ort to exert given initial conditions and their expectations, which we assume
that are determined based on the initial conditions. These decisions on direct e¤ort plus the
process of oblique socialization give as an outcome the distribution of young individuals for next
generation: Lt+1; 
HB
t+1 ; 
HG
t+1.
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Once the distribution of young individuals is revealed, the number of units of search for the
good job is determined (ut+1). Moreover, the amount of young individuals with high education
is also known (HGt+1 + 
HB
t+1), which must coincide with the number of old individuals in this
generation with high education (HGt+1+
HB
t+1 = 
HG
t+1+
HB
t+1). Therefore, the number of individuals
with low education in generation t+ 1 can be identied (LBt+1 = 
L
t+1).
At this point, rms decide how many vacancies of the good job to open (vt+1). Notice,
however, that rms do not know how many over-educated individuals there will be in this
generation. This means that they cannot forecast the production level of bad jobs (although
they know the production level of good jobs, as they know the number of people with high
education). We assume that, similarly to individualsexpectations, the production level of bad
jobs next period will be the same as in this period. Given this, they decide how many vacancies
to open.
Once vacancies are decided, the matching function tells us how many matches in the good
job there will be: HGt+1 = m(ut+1; vt+1). Therefore, now we also know how many overeducated
individuals there will be in this generation (HBt+1 =  LBt+1 HGt+1). Notice then that we already
know the distribution of individuals of generation t+1 in the labor market and therefore, we can
compute aggregate production and any other measure of interest.
3 Simulation exercises
In this section we do comparative static analysis of the model by means of numerical exercises.
In all the following simulations we analyze an economy that starts with 70% of the population
with low education, 20% of the population with high education and employed in a good job
and the other 10% is over-educated (high education and bad job). We also assume that the
probability to nd a good job for this generation was 0.8 for those in a good network.
The values of the baseline economy are the following:  = 0:5;  = 0:6;A = 10; = 0:5; " =
0:8; IS = 0:5;S = 1 and s = 0:8. Moreover, the functional forms used are6
fH(dHjt ; 
j
t ) =
 
dHjt
0:6 
jt
0:4
;
u(lijt ; d
ij
t ) =

lijt
0:8 
dijt
0:2
;
m(ut; vt) = (u

t + v

t )
1=;where  =  1:27,
g(jt ) =

jt
2
:
6The value of  in the matching function is taken from the calibration in Den Haan, Ramey and Watson (2000).
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3.1 Denition of aggregate variables
We are interested in measuring several aggregate variables. For measuring social mobility and
equality of opportunity we base on Erikson and Goldthorpe (1993, pp. 55-59). The rest of
variables are self-explanatory.
Measures of social mobility: Absolute mobility rates refer to the proportions of individ-
uals in some base category who are mobile.
Upward mobility: Probability to change from a Bad Network to a Good Network.
UM =
LHt+1P
BG
t+1
LB
t +
HH
B;t+1P
BG
t+1
HB
t
LBt + 
HB
t
We can compute the same measure for each type of family:
Upward mobility-low education: Probability to change from a family with low educated
parent to a good job.
UML = 
LH
t+1P
BG
t+1
Upward mobility-high education: Probability to change from a family with highly educated
family with bad network to a good job.
UMH = 
HH
B;t+1P
BG
t+1
Downward mobility: Probability to change from a Good Network to a Bad Network.
DM = HLG;t+1 +
HH
G;t+1P
GB
t+1
Measures of equality of opportunity: They evaluate the existence of discrimination
across groups.
Relative mobility= Probability of change from Bad to Good NetworkProbability of transition from Good to Good Network = RM =
UM
1 DM
Relative mobility-low education= Probability of change from low educated family to Good NetworkProbability of transition from Good to Good Network = RML =
UML
1 DM
Relative mobility-high education= Probability of change from educated family with bad network to Good NetworkProbability of transition from Good to Good Network =
RMH =
UMH
1 DM
Perfect equality of opportunity occurs when all measures of relative mobility are equal to
one. Then family origins do not matter for outcome.
Other measures of interest:
Aggregate production=Y = HGt yGt + (  HGt )yBt.
Measure of over-education= % of over-educated workers=HBt =:
11
Measure of aggregate human capital= % of people with high education=(HBt + 
HG
t )=:
Measure of income inequality=Gini Index of wages:
Gini = 1  yB
yB + HG (yG   yB) =
HG (yG   yB)
yB + HG (yG   yB) :
3.2 Segregation index (new housing policy, public housing, school policy...)
In this exercise we compare an economy with perfect segregation with a fully integrated economy.
As Figure 1 reveals, full segregation slows down the transition towards the long run equilibrium
While the economy with zero segregation converges after 15 generations, the fully segregated
economy needs double time to get to the long run equilibrium. This a¤ects strongly the initial
years of transition. Educational expansion is faster without segregation, although in the long run
equilibrium, the segregated society achieves a larger proportion of individuals with a good job
and less individuals with low education. This dynamic path is the result of parental decisions on
direct e¤ort, which is much larger in the rst generations when there is no segregation (see Figure
2). In contrast, in the fully segregated society, the pick of parental e¤ort for individuals in the
bad network happens after 22 generations. Notice also that in the fully segregated society the
parents from the good network (HG) spend only time with their kids because it directly enters
their utility function. The transmission of high education is guaranteed for their children with
oblique socialization alone since they will meet someone with high education with probability 1.
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Figure 1. Evolution of the population distribution for fully segregated and fully integrated
societies.
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Figure 2. Parental time devoted to children in fully segregated and fully integrated societies.
Figures 3 and 4 show the measures of social mobility, equality of opportunity and inequality
for these two economies. Regarding social mobility (Figure 3), the long run equilibrium level of
social mobility is similar for both economies (around 70% of individuals born in a bad network
will end up in the good network). However, the transition paths are very di¤erent. The society
with zero segregation presents a steep increase in social mobility in the rst ten generations,
while for the fully segregated economy, social mobility changes marginally over the same period
of time. Equality of opportunity is also much higher in the fully integrated society, with faster
convergence to the long run equilibrium (Figure 4). Di¤erences in equality of opportunity are,
however, small in the long run.
The Gini index comes up very large for both economies and while it is larger for the segregated
economy during the rst 23 generations, the situation reverses afterwards (Figure 4).
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Figure 3. Probability of upward mobility for a fully integrated and a fully segregated society.
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Figure 4. Measures of equality of opportunity and income inequality in a fully segregated and
a fully integrated society.
3.3 Quality of time of low educated parents () (courses on how to take care
of your kid, early education programs,...)
In this section we compare an economy where the time quality of parents with low education is
half the time quality of parents with high education with an economy where the time quality
of parents with low education is seventy percent that of parent with high education. As it can
be seen in Figure 5, policies devoted to improve parental time quality of disadvantaged families
reduces the transition time by half in our example. It does not a¤ect, however, the level of
over-education that is stable and equal across time. This is mostly due to an advancement of
the level of e¤ort to the rst generations and an increase in the level of e¤ort of low educated
families when their time quality is higher (Figure 6).
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Figure 5. Evolution of population distribution for societies with di¤erent quality of time of low
educated parents.
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Figure 6. Parental time devoded to children for two societies with di¤erent time quality of low
educated parents.
Obviously, the levels of social mobility and equality of opportunity are larger in the society
where time parental quality is larger (Figures 7 and 8). This keeps true even in the long run
for those individuals with low educated parents. Surprisingly, though, the level of inequality is
signicantly larger for the rst 10 generations in the society with larger time parental quality.
This is due to the rapid increase of individuals in good jobs in this society during this period.
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Figure 7. Probability of upward mobility for two societies with di¤erent time quality of low
educated parents.
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Figure 8. Measures of equality of opportunity and income inequality in two societies with
di¤erent time quality of low educated parents.
3.4 s/S: e¢ ciency units of search for each network.
Here we analyze an economy where probability of nding a good job if you come from a bad
network is 70% that of someone from a good network and compare it to an economy where this
probability is 90% that of someone from a good network. It turns out that convergence to the
long run equilibrium is faster in the latter economy (Figure 9). Moreover, the level of over-
education is lower when the probability to nd a job is less dependent on the type of network
you are in. This is due to the fact that a higher s translates into more e¢ ciency units of search,
and therefore, more vacancies are open. Consequently, the number of matches in the good job
sector is larger the larger is s.
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Figure 9. Evolution of the population distribution for two societies with di¤erent networking
inuence in the labor market.
In Figure 10 we can see that the long run direct e¤ort of individuals in a bad job does not
depend on the network e¤ects in the labor market. Notwithstanding, during transition, direct
e¤ort of these individuals is increased when s = 0:9, since the expected value of their kid having
high education is larger because the probability of getting a good job increased. Individuals
in the good network seem to decrease their e¤ort from the seventh generation on, suggesting a
substitution e¤ect of their e¤ort by the oblique socialization that occurs more often in a more
educated society.
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Figure 10. Parental time devoted to children in two societies that di¤er in their networking
importance in the labor market.
Upward mobility increases strongly when the e¢ ciency units of search associated to individ-
uals from a bad network increase since it rises aggregate e¢ ciency units of search, enhancing
the creation of new vacancies and creating a larger amount of good jobs. As a consequence,
it is more likely for anyone to change from a bad network to the good network (Figure 11).
Moreover, since changing from s = 0:7 to s = 0:9 we are reducing the di¤erences across types of
family, the equality of opportunity increases signicantly (Figure 12).
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Figure 11. Probability of upward mobility for two societies with di¤erent networking inuence
in the labor market.
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Figure 12. Measures of equality of opportunity and income inequality in two societies with
di¤erent impact of networks in the labor market.
3.5 Cost of creating a vacancy:  (reduction of bureaucracy).
Figure 13 shows the evolution of the population distribution in two economies that di¤er in
the cost of creating a vacancy for a good job. An increase in vacancy costs clearly rises the
amount of over-educated individuals in the economy, via a reduction in the amount of vacancies
open. While the transition period length is similar in both cases, changes in the population
distribution are more intense in the rst generations for the economy with lower vacancy costs.
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Figure 13. Evolution of population distribution for two societies with di¤erent vacancy costs.
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Figure 14. Parental time devoted to children in two societies with di¤erent vacancy costs.
While social mobility is higher in the case of low vacancy costs during transition and in the
long run (Figure 15), equality of opportunity is only signicantly larger in the rst 15 generations
and inequality (Gini index) is also larger (Figure 16).
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Figure 15. Probability of upward mobility for two societies with di¤erent vacancy costs.
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Figure 16. Measures of equality of opportunity and income inequality in two societies with
di¤erent vacancy costs.
3.6 Worker bargaining power  (presence of unions for instance).
An increase in workersbargaining power in the economy results in a similar transition period as
with the case of a reduction in vacancy costs, except that over-education now increases (Figure
17). Moreover, in the long run equilibrium, the number of good jobs is lower, since rms have
less incentives to open vacancies. Similarly as in the previous case, the parental e¤ort increases
for the rst generations, and specially for the over-educated individuals (Figure 18). This leads
to higher social mobility and a drastic increase in equality of opportunity, with small changes
in inequality mostly for the rst 10 generations (Figure 20).
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Figure 17. Evolution of the population distribution for two societies with di¤erent workers
bargaining power.
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Figure 18. Parental time devoted to children in two societies with di¤erent workersbargaining
power.
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Figure 19. Probability of upward mobility for two societies with di¤erent workersbargaining
power.
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Figure 20. Mesures of equality of opportunity and income inequality for two societies with
di¤erent workersbargaining power.
4 Conclusions
We study the interaction of the cultural transmission of education from parents to kids and
the e¤ect of networks in a labor market with frictions to analyze the relationship between
social mobility, over-education and inequality. We develop a general equilibrium framework that
allows for the realization of counter-factual analyses. We perform several simulation exercises to
understand the e¤ect of several policies in a simulated ction economy. We learned for instance
that the transition to the equilibrium might take even 30 generations and in general, takes longer
in the presence of social segregation than without it.
Policies devoted to decrease the degree of social segregation (housing or school policies)
enhance the education expansion, social mobility and the equality of opportunity at the cost of
32
a smaller good sector and larger inequality in the long run.
Policies devoted to improve the job matching process (public employment o¢ ces, unemployed
training, reduction of administrative costs to open vacancies) decrease over-education levels
and have a positive impact on social mobility while the e¤ect on equality of opportunity and
inequality is not clear.
Policies that a¤ect the bargaining power of workers have a positive e¤ect on social mobility
and equality of opportunity at the cost of increasing over-education, while leaving inequality
unchanged.
Further work will consist on calibrating the model to real economies in order to verify the
explanatory power of the model. We aim at then using it to assess the e¤ect of alternative
policies on real economies.
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